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Restraints on Executive Emergency Power
in the United States and Canada
By JAMES S. FAY
Member of the Class of 1980
I. INTRODUCTION: THE FRAILTY OF DEMOCRATIC
POLITICAL SYSTEMS
Democratic freedoms are relatively rare in the world-a minority
of United Nations members are functioning democracies. The loss of
political freedoms by the citizens of any democracy is a matter of seri-
ous concern. In the past five decades, several fledgling democracies
have witnessed the demise of their citizens' political rights. In these
countries the eclipse of democracy was accomplished through the
peacetime invocation of emergency powers by the Chief Executive.
Constitutional and statutory provisions meant to safeguard the nation
in times of crisis proved to be the means for terminating both demo-
cratic freedoms and a democratic government.' The lesson of these ex-
amples of constitutional failure is relevant to the contemporary North
American scene.
The United States and Canada, two of the world's most vigorous
democracies, have been blessed with uninterrupted decades during
which democratic freedoms and a democratic spirit of accomodation
among the people have been able to develop. Both countries, however,
have statutory and constitutional provisions granting extraordinary
powers to the Chief Executive in times of crisis. In the past decade
both countries have invoked such provisions.
In October 1970, Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau invoked
emergency powers to deal with terrorist activity in the Province of Que-
bec. In March 1970 and August 1971, President Nixon declared states
1. The German Weimar Republic in 1932, South Korea in 1972, the Philippines in
1974, and India in 1975. See A. BRECHT, PRELUDE TO SILENCE, THE END OF THE GE EMAN
REPUBLIC (1944); Kim, Emergency Development, andHuman Rights, 18 ASIAN SURVEY 363
(1978); Noble, Emergency Politics in the Philppines, 18 ASIAN SURVEY 350 (1978); Palmer,
India in 1975 Democracy in Eclose, 16 AsiAN SURVEY 95 (1976); Park, Political Crir in
India, 1975, 15 AsIAN SURVEY 996 (1975).
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of national emergency to deal with postal and international monetary
crises, respectively.
2
Neither the crisis in Quebec nor the recent states of emergency in
the United States has resulted in a measurable erosion of democratic
institutions in the two nations. The ease with which such powers were
invoked by the Prime Minister and the President and the potential
damage to civil liberties such powers might wreak on each nation, how-
ever, have been a cause of concern to legislators, scholars, and citizens
in both countries.
This Note examines the constitutional and statutory specifics of
emergency power in both nations, analyzes the judicial and legislative
restraints that have been and may be employed to temper the dangers
incident to the invocation of such power, highlights judicial and legisla-
tive controls in both political systems which hold the greatest practical
hope for minimizing the risks of states of siege, and finally offers sug-
gestions for future research in this area of political-legal studies.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
EMERGENCY POWERS IN CANADA
Three key legal provisions, one constitutional 'and two statutory,
are the foundation of government emergency power in Canada. First,
Article 91 of the British North America Act (the Constitution of Ca-
nada) provides the Canadian Parliament with exceedingly broad power
to make "Laws for the Peace, Order, and Good Government of Ca-
nada" [hereinafter cited as the p.o.g.g. power]. Article 91 also provides
that,
[N]o House of Commons shall continue for more than five years
from the day of the return of the Writs for choosing the House pro-
vided, however, that a House of Commons may in time of real or
apprehended war, invasion or insurrection be continued by the Par-
liament of Canada if such continuation is not opposed by the votes of
more than one-third of the members of such House.
3
There has been no occasion for the exercise of the constitutional provi-
sion extending the national Parliament beyond its legally constituted
2. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON THE TERMINATION OF THE NAT'L EMERGENCY, 93d
CONG., IST SESS. SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY POWER STATUTES 5 (Comm. Print 1973); HAN-
SARD 193 (Oct. 16, 1970). An emergency is an existing or anticipated condition which is
perceived to threaten the life or well being of individuals, groups, or the state beyond tolera-
ble limits. See J.M. SMITH & C. COTTER, POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT DURINO CRISIS, at
ch. III (1960).
3. British North America (No. 2) Act, 1949, 13 Geo. 6, ch. 91 (U.K.).
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term.4
The second basis for emergency power is section 6 of the Canadian
Bill of Rights.5 The key elements of section 6 are: subsection (1),
wherein the Governor in Council can declare a state of siege even if
war, invasion or insurrection is only a possibility; subsection (3), which
provides Parliament the power to force a debate on the declaration of
emergency; and subsection (5), which provides that no Executive action
taken under the War Measures Act shall be deemed to conflict with the
Canadian Bill of Rights.6 In other words, Executive actions will not be
considered violations of the Bill of Rights for the duration of the crisis.
The third foundation of Canadian emergency power is the War
Measures Act which grants the Government complete power to declare
a state of siege and provides for an expansive scope of emergency pow-
ers ranging from censorship and economic controls to rule by executive
edict.
7
4. A similar provision in the constitution of India, however, was used to extend the life
of the Indian Parliament during the 1975 crisis. See Palmer, supra, note 1, at 103.
5. The Canadian Bill of Rights 1960, CAN. REV. STAT. c.44 (1970). Section 6 of the
War Measures Act is repealed and the following substituted therefor
[6.] (1) Sections 3,4, 5 shall come into force only upon the issue of a proc-
lamation to the Governor in Council declaring that war, invasion or insurrection,
real or apprehended, exists.
(2) A proclamation declaring that war, invasion or insurrection, real or ap-
prehended, exists shall be laid before Parliament forthwith after its issue, or, if
Parliament is then not sitting, within the first fifteen days next thereafter that Par-
liament is sitting.
(3) Where a proclamation has been laid before Parliament pursuant to sub-
section (2), a notice of motion in either House signed by ten members thereof and
made in accordance with the rules of that House within ten days of the day the
proclamation was laid before Parliament, praying that the proclamation be re-
voked, shall be debated in that House at the first convenient opportunity within the
four sitting days next after the day of the motion in that House was made.
(4) If both Houses of Parliament resolve that the proclamation be revoked, it
shall cease to have effect, and sections 3, 4, and 5 shall cease to be in force until
those sections are again brought into force by a further proclamation but without
prejudice to the previous operation of those sections or anything duly done or suf-
fered thereunder or any offence commited or any penalty or forfeiture or punish-
ment incurred.
(5) Any act or thing done or authorized or any order or regulation made
under the authority of this Act, shall be deemed not to be an abrogation, abridge-
ment or infringement of any right or freedom recognized by the Canadian Bill of
_Nghts.
6. The powers of the Governor in Council are in essence exercised by the Prime Minis-
ter and his cabinet. See P. HOGG, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 146 (1977).
7. War Measures Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. W-2 (1970). Sections 2-5 of the War Meas-
ures Act follow-
2. The issue of a proclamation by Her Majesty, or under the authority of the Gov-
ernor in Council shall be conclusive evidence that war, invasion, or insurrection,
No. 1]
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The key elements of the War Measures Act are section 2, wherein
the finding of an emergency by the Governor in Council (the Govern-
ment) is conclusive; section 3, granting to the Government during the
crisis, dictatorial power over persons and property; section 4, providing
for summary punishment of violations of Executive emergency orders;
and section 5, suspending bail'and writs of habeas corpus.
III. JUDICIAL LIMITATIONS ON DOMESTIC
EXECUTIVE EMERGENCY POWERS
The examination of the Canadian judiciary's oversight in the area
real or apprehended, exists and has existed for any period of time therein stated,
and of its continuance, until by the issue of a further proclamation it is declared
that the war, invasion or insurrection no longer exists.
3. POWERS OF THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL
(1) The Governor in Council may do and authorize such acts and things, and
make from time to time such orders and regulations, as he may by reason of the
existence of real or apprehended war, invasion or insurrection deem necessary or
advisable for the security, defence, peace, order, and welfare of Canada; and for
greater certainty, but not so as to restrict the generality of the foregoing terms, it is
hereby declared that the powers of the Governor in Council extend to all matters
coming within the classes of subjects hereinafter enumerated, namely,
(a) censorship and the control and suppression of publications, writings,
maps, plans, photographs, communications and means of communication;
(b) arrest, detention, exclusion and deportation;
(c) control of the harbours, ports and territorial waters of Canada and
the movements of vessels;
(d) transportation by land, air, or water and the control of the transport
of persons and things;
(e) trading, exportation, importation, production and manufacture;
(f) appropriation, control, forfeiture and disposition of property and of
the use thereof.
(2) All orders and regulations made under this section have the force of law,
and shall be enforced in such manner and by such courts, officers and authorities
as the Governor in Council may prescribe, and may be varied, extended or re-
voked by any subsequent order of regulation; but if any order or regulation is
varied, extended or revoked, neither the previous operation thereof nor anything
duly done thereunder, is affected thereby, nor is any right, privilege, obligation or
liability acquired, accrued, accruing or incurred thereunder affected by such varia-
tion, extension or revocation.
4. The Governor in Council may prescribe the penalties that may be imposed for
violations of orders and regulations made under this Act, and may also prescribe
whether such penalties shall be imposed upon summary conviction or upon indict-
ment, but no such penalty shall exceed a fine of five thousand dollars or imprison-
ment for any term not exceeding five years, or both.
5. No person who is held for deportation under this Act or under any regulation
made thereunder, or is under arrest or detention as an alien enemy, or upon suspi-
cion that he is an alien enemy, or to prevent his departure from Canada, shall be
released upon bail or otherwise discharged or tried, without the consent of the
Minister of Justice.
[Vol. 3
Restraints on Executive Emergency Power
of emergency powers begins with a discussion of the Article 91 p.o.g.g.
power. Prior to 1949, the final judicial word on Canadian legal matters
was exercised by the United Kingdom's Privy Council and thereafter
by the Supreme Court of Canada.8 Evidence that the p.o.g.g. power
might be used as broad authority for government action by the Domin-
ion government in times of emergency first arose in the Board of Com-
merce case.9 There the Privy Council held that, although "highly
exceptional circumstances" such as war or famine, not present in this
case, would be needed, Parliament could invoke the p.o.g.g. power and
involve the Dominion (National) government in economic regulation
thought to be the exclusive responsibility of the provinces.' 0 Although
the result was to the contrary in Board of Commerce, the Privy Council
suggested that a statute might be held constitutional if it was of limited
duration and applicable to all of Canada."I Thus, the Court was sug-
gesting the outlines of a temporary measures test and a national dimen-
sions test.
The Privy Council and later the Canadian Supreme Court showed
great reluctance to give the p.o.g.g. power any vitality in situations
short of war or national disaster. However, once Parliament, under
section 6 of the War Measures Act, had proclaimed that "war, invasion,
or insurrection, real or apprehended, exists," the Supreme Court, ap-
plying this strict emergency test was willing to give a broad sweep to the
Federal Parliament's p.o.g.g. power. For example, under the p.o.g.g.
power, price and rent controls during and after a wartime period were
upheld, as was the deportation of Canadian citizens of Japanese ances-
try.1
2
Recently, the Canadian Supreme Court has been willing to expand
the emergency doctrine beyond a wartime situation. In the Anli-Infla-
8. P. HOGG, supra note 6, at 129; B. STRAYER, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION IN
CANADA, at 3-28 (1968).
9. Att'y Gen. of Can. v. Att'y Gen. of Alta [1922] 60 D.L.R. 513 (P.C.). This is the
Board of Commerce case.
10. Id. at 517. Since Canada has a parliamentary form of government in which the
executive branch is in fact a part of the legislature there is no doctrine of separation of
powers. To the extent that the courts impose restraints on Parliament, the restraints apply
with equal validity upon the Executive. See B. STRAYER, supra note 8, at 90.
11. Id. at 516.
12. Fort Francis Pulp & Power Co. v. Manitoba Free Press Co., [19231 3 D.L.R. 629
(P.C.); In re Wartime Leasehold Regulations Reference, [1950] 2 D.L.R. 1; Co-op Comm.
on Japanese Canadians v. Att'y Gen. of Can., [1947] 1 D.L.R. 577. Hogg employs the word
"test" as a way of identifying the criteria utilized by the courts to determine whether emer-
gency powers will be upheld under the p.o.g.g. power. Of course, no formal tests are actu-
ally made. See HOGG, supra note 6, at ch. 14.
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tion Reference case, for example, the Court, applying a loose emergency
test, agreed with the Government that almost two years of double-digit
inflation could be characterized as an emergency justifying broad exer .
cise of the p.o.g.g. power by the federal government.'
3
The consensus of rulings is that once an emergency is found to
exist by the Federal Parliament, the Parliament has plenary power to
legislate under the p.o.g.g. clause. Such power overrides restrictions in
the British North America Act thereby permitting the Parliament to
legislate in areas traditionally reserved to the Provinces.1
4
Does the Supreme Court of Canada and its predecessor, the Privy
Council, place no restraints on the Federal Parliament in defining and
declaring an emergency, thus opening the way to an extremely broad
Parliamentary interpretation of the p.o.g.g. power? Is there a contem-
porary court doctrine to restrain governmental use of emergency pow-
ers? The answers are somewhat mixed.
The Canadian High Court, resurrecting the temporary measures
test in the Anti-Inflation Reference case appears to place some emphasis
on Parliament's limiting the duration of an emergency. That the Anti-
Inflation Act was passed by Parliament as a temporary measure ap-
pears to be a relevant but not dispositive factor in the Court's accept-
ance of the Act's validity. The constitutional scholar, Peter W. Hogg,
puts the temporary measures test into historical context and emphasizes
its relevance by noting that as yet "no permanent measure has ever
been upheld under the emergency power." 15
Ostensibly the temporary measures test is a rather strict imposition
on the powers of Parliament. Parliament can initially satisfy this test
with ease, however, by declaring the emergency powers are to be em-
ployed only on a temporary basis. Later, when the emergency powers
are about to expire, the Parliament could renew them, arguing the
emergency has not passed.' 6
The Privy Council in the Canadian Temperance Federation case
and the Canadian Supreme Court in the Anti-Inflation Reference case
also suggested that if the scope of the problem was truly national and if
uniformity of the legislation was a desirable way to confront the prob-
lem, then the Parliament's action likely would be held constitutional.
Applying this national dimensions test in Canadian Temperance Federa-
13. In re Anti-Inflation Act Reference, 68 D.L.R.3d 452 (1976).
14. See W. TARNOPOLSKY, THE CANADIAN BILL OF RIGHTS 323-24 (2d ed, 1975).
15. P. HOGG, supra note 6, at 257.
16. Id. at 256.
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tion the Privy Council declared. 7
In their Lordships' opinion, the true test must be found in the real
subject-matter of the legislation: if it is such that it goes beyond local
or provincial concern or interests and must from its inherent nature
be the concern of the Dominion as a whole .. then it will fall
within the competence of the Dominion Parliament as a matter af-
fecting the peace, order and good government of Canada, though it
may in another aspect touch upon matters specially reserved to the
Provincial Legislature. War and pestilence, no doubt, are instances;
so too may be the drink or drug traffic, or the carrying of arms.'
s
In the Anti-Inflation Reference case 9 the Court cautioned that "the
mere desire for uniformity cannot be a support for an exercise of the
federal general power." However, the fact that the statute in question
was a measured legislative response to a problem affecting "the well
being of the people of Canada as a whole" was a significant element in
the court's ratification of Parliament's action. °
A final potentially limiting doctrine refined by the Canadian High
Court is the rationalbasis test which was also discussed in Anti-Inflation
Reference. In Anti-Inflation Reference the Court asserted that it must
find some "rational basis" to approve drastic Parliamentary action in a
crisis or alleged crisis.2' The Court, exercising judicial restraint, lim-
ited the utility of this test when it noted that Parliament need not even
declare a crisis or an emergency exists to justify the invocation of emer-
gency powers for the Government. In the words of the Court, it is not
telling against the Government's case "that the word 'emergency' was
not used."22 However, the Court continued, "forceful language would
not carry the day.. . if the circumstances attending its use did not
support the constitutional significance sought to be drawn from it."
2'
In other words, the Court required some objective evidence of a crisis
before approving the invocation of emergency powers by Parliament.
Unfortunately, from a legal perspective, no cases reached the
Supreme Court dealing with the national state of emergency imposed
to manage the 1970 terrorist crisis in Quebec.24 Inferior courts, how-
ever, did discuss the invocation of the War Measures Act of 1952 and
17. Att'y Gen. of Ont. v. Can. Temperance Federation, 11946] 2 D.L.R. 1 (P.C.).
18. Id. at 5-6.
19. In re Anti-Inflation Act Reference, 68 D.L.R.3d 477 (1976).
20. Id. at 498.
21. Id. at 496, 498.
22. Id. at 495.
23. Id. at 495.
24. On October 5, 1970 the Front for the Liberation of Quebec (F.L.Q.) kidnapped the
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its interrelation with the Canadian Bill of Rights in Gagnon and Pal-
lieres v. The Queen.25 In this decision, with five separate opinions, the
Quebec Court of Appeal obliquely considered certain constitutional el-
ements of the War Measures Act and refused to strike down any of
them. In a thoughtful opinion which emphasized judicial restraint,
Judge Brossard ruled the trial court was correct in refusing to examine
the Prime Minister's reasons for proclaiming the existence of an appre-
hended insurrection.26 He also held the 1970 state of emergency was
constitutional and not in violation of the Canadian Bill of Rights."
This appellate decision appears to fit comfortably into the general
philosophy of restraint articulated by the Supreme Court when dealing
with parliamentary or executive handling of crisis situations. The High
Court has defined several doctrines including the temporary measures
test, the national dimensions test and the rational basis test, and then
applied them gingerly to the cases. A likely reason for this reserve is
that Canadian judges are not yet accustomed to exercising judicial re-
view in as robust and cocksure a manner as are their American cous-
ins.28 The Canadian Supreme Court, offering the Government a large
degree of flexibility in defining and managing crises, has set some
loosely defined limits on the actions of Parliament and the Prime Min-
ister. These limits could give the Court plausible grounds to restrain
the Government if, in the Court's judgment, its reach extends too far.
On the basis of past performance it is doubtful these particular
doctrinal restraints on the power of the Government would be of great
utility in a general national emergency. Nevertheless, the restraints
might be effective in enabling the Court to temper the Government's
reaction to a local crisis.
IV. PARLIAMENTARY LIMITATIONS ON DOMESTIC
EXECUTIVE EMERGENCY POWERS
When it enacted the War Measures Act and amended it with sec-
tion 6 of the Bill of Rights,29 the Federal Parliament granted the cabi-
net and the Prime Minister vast powers over rights and liberties of all
British Trade Commissioner in Montreal. Five days later the F.L.Q. kidnapped the Quebec
Minister of Labor and Immigration. W. TARNOPOLSKY, supra note 14, at 332-33.
25. Crim. Rep., New. Ser., 321 (1971).
26. Id. at 348.
27. Id. at 355.
28. B. STRAYER, supra note 8, at 27-28.
29. War Measures Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c.W-2 (1970); The Canadian Bill of Rights
1960, CAN. REV. STAT. c.44 (1970).
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Canadian citizens. Once the War Measures Act is invoked, Parlia-
ment's de facto control over the actions of the Government is limited,
assuming the Government has a comfortable majority and can keep its
own party members in line during a parliamentary vote of confidence.
The most the parliamentary Opposition can do to protest the use
of the War Measures Act is to invoke subsection 3 of section 6 of the
Bill of Rights which mandates a general debate in Parliament on the
wisdom of invoking the Act. This capacity to force a debate may not
be as innocuous as it at first appears. For example, the debate which
occurred after the Government invoked the War Measures Act in Octo-
ber of 1970 provided both a useful occasion for the opposition to pres-
sure the Government into justifying its behavior and an opportunity for
opposition members of the Parliament to offer some thoughtful criti-
cism of the Government's actions.
Seizing the initiative itself rather than waiting for the opposition to
force the debate, the Liberal Party (Government) leaders submitted to
Parliament both the regulations they had enacted under the War Meas-
ures Act and the rationale for their actions. Prime Minister Trudeau
stressed the need for dispatch and the absence of alternative legislative
authority as the political and technical reasons for invoking the War
Measures Act. The Prime Minister also noted that the Government
had not availed itself of all the powers under the Act and the House of
Commons would be "kept fully informed if any changes in the regula-
tions are made."30 The Minister of Justice, Mr. Turner, emphasized
that without emergency powers the investigation and prosecution of a
violent criminal conspiracy would be difficult, if not impossible.
31
The opposition leader and shadow Prime Minister, Mr. Stansfield,
pointed out the difficulty of mounting a serious challenge to the Gov-
ernment regarding the invocation of the Act. Stansfield bemoaned the
fact that "the opposition are not in a position to judge whether there is
a real or apprehended insurrection. The Government is the only one in
the position to know."32 Stansfield also voiced concern over the policy
implications of the Government's claim to such extraordinary powers
and called for limits on the extent and duration of the emergency pow-
ers.3
3
Other opposition members of Parliament were less restrained in
their comments on the Government's action. Criticizing the Govern-
30. HANSARD 194 (Oct. 16, 1970).
31. Id. at 214.
32. Id. at 195.
33. Id. at 195.
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ment's rationale for restoring and preserving order, Mr. Lewis noted,
"that every dictator in the history of humanity has justified his dictato-
rial acts by declaring that he was preserving order in society." 34 Mr.
Douglas, leader of the New Democratic Party, denounced the Govern-
ment's acquisition of emergency powers, claiming that "right now there
is no constitution in this country . . the government now has the
power. . . to do anything it wants."35 Former Prime Minister Diefen-
baker asserted that Parliament was being asked to give approval to a
series of regulations placing the freedoms of Canada in cold storage for
several months. He felt it would be far better to make necessary
amendments to the criminal code to deal with the immediate exigency
than to resort to the War Measures Act.36 Mr. Brewin, a member from
Greenwood, observed, "the government in proceeding to proclaim the
War Measures Act has gone far beyond any reasonable balance and
unwittingly has endangered the rights and liberties of Canadians in a
manner and in a degree far beyond that required to meet the present
crisis."' 37 He charged that the Constitution had been suspended, the
Bill of Rights torn up, and the authority of the Provinces superseded by
the action of the Government, all because of lawless acts in only one
Canadian province. Finally, Mr. Brewin noted the Quebec authorities,
in calling upon the Federal Government for aid, never asked for the
invocation of the War Measures Act or the suspension of the Constitu-
tion.38 In short, the Government overreacted.
The Government conceded that the invocation of the War Meas-
ures Act conferred excessive authority upon the Executive and within
three weeks offered a bill reducing the scope and duration of its emer-
gency powers.39 Whether flaws in its initial action, Parliamentary criti-
cism, or anticipation of further criticism in Parliament motivated the
Government to reduce the original powers it had taken upon itself is
uncertain. But the entire episode demonstrated the capacity of the op-
position in Parliament to focus attention on the specific action taken by
the Cabinet, to present public criticism, and to offer alternatives to that
action. Insofar as consensus policy making is important, the Canadian
Parliament, particularly the opposition, may be able to exercise some
34. Id. at 217.
35. Id. at 199.
36. Id. at 203.
37. Id. at 234.
38. Id. at 235.
39. W. TARNOPOLSKY, supra note 14, at 345.
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measure of restraint over the Government's declaration and execution
of a state of emergency.
To the extent that Canadians have provided their Executive with
extensive constitutional and statutory emergency powers and only
modestly circumscribed those powers by court doctrine, the ill-defined
power of parliamentary debate and uncertain weight of tradition may
be the only bulwarks to abuse of those emergency powers.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY EMERGENCY
POWER PROVISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
The constitutional and statutory provision for emergency powers
in the United States are unlike those for Canada. Although the United
States Constitution grants to the Congress emergency power to suspend
habeas corpus,4' no power as sweeping as the Canadian p.o.g.g. power
is assigned to either the executive or legislative branches by the United
States Constitution. Congress, reluctant to invoke its own emergency
authority, has preferred to confer emergency power on the President.
United States Presidents, for their part, have often invoked emergency
authority they felt was implicit in their capacity as Commander-in-
Chief and Chief Executive. They have exercised or attempted to exer-
cise extraordinary power over the lives and property of their country-
men.
Analyses of emergency powers in the United States have focused
on these implicit powers assumed by several Presidents and on the stat-
utory authority granted the Chief Executive in a state of emergency.
The Special Senate Committee on the Termination of the National
Emergency found that there were over 470 Federal statutes granting
extraordinary powers to the President.4' As the Senate Committee
noted,
Under the powers delegated by these statutes, the President
may: seize property, organize and control the means of production;
seize commodities; assign military forces abroad; institute martial
law; seize and control all transportation and communication; regu-
late the operation of private enterprise; restrict travel; and, in a pleth-
ora of particular ways, control the lives of all American citizens.42
40. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cL2.
41. STAFF OF SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON THE TERMINATION OF THE NATIONAL EMER-
GENCY 93d Cong., 1st Sess., SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY PowER STATUTEs 6 (Comm. Print
1973).
42. Id. at III.
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Three examples from 470 statutes illustrate the expansive power
granted to the Chief Executive. One statute permits the President "dur-
ing a war or a declared national emergency" to detail members of the
armed forces "to assist in military matters" in any foreign country.
4 3
Under a second statute, the President is empowered to amend "as he
may see fit" the rules and regulations of the Federal Communication
Commission and can "cause the closing of any facility or station for
wire communication." 44 Finally, under a third provision of the United
States Code Presidential actions might not even be subject to judicial
review.45
Congress was troubled by such extraordinary powers possessed by
the Chief Executive during four separate and continuing states of emer-
gency declared by Presidents Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and
Richard Nixon. Some members of the Senate Special Committee on
National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, which con-
ducted the bulk of the research on this general topic, were surprised to
learn the United States had been operating under a state of emergency
for forty years when the Committee began its work in 1973.46
Reacting to this extended state of emergency, the Committee
members agreed that their prime goal must be the termination of these
states of emergency 7 The Congress accepted the Committee's recom-
mendations; the passage of PL 94-412, the National Emergencies Act
(hereinafter cited as the Act), accomplished the committee's goal. 8
The action of the Senate Special Committee was taken against the
backdrop of the Watergate crisis and in a political atmosphere increas-
ingly distrustful of unguided Executive power. The Senate Special
Committee also conducted its hearings mindful of over a century of
court doctrine which had analyzed and often checked executive branch
excursions into the unmarked fields of emergency power.
43. 10 U.S.C. § 712 (1976).
44. 47 U.S.C. § 606 (1976).
45. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1976). Section (a) exempts Presidential action from judicial review
if the statutory authority for Executive action precludes review or if the action of the Execu-
tive agency is committed to agency discretion by law.
46. SPECIAL COMM. ON NATIONAL EMERGENCIES AND DELEGATED EMERGENCY POW-
ERS, FINAL REPORT, S. REP. No. 94-922, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1976). The impetus, the
leadership, the research, the hearings, and the basic shape of the National Emergencies leg-
islation all took place in the United States Senate. Only during the final stages of the legisla-
tive process did the House of Representatives play a role.
47. Id. at 4. See also COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, NATIONAL EMERGENCIES, H.R. REP.
No. 94-238, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975).
48. National Emergencies Act, §§ 101-502, 50 U.S.C. § § 1601-51 (1976).
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VI. JUDICIAL LIMITATIONS ON DOMESTIC
EXECUTIVE EMERGENCY POWERS
Throughout American history the opinions of the United States
Supreme Court regarding the permissible limits of Executive domestic
emergency powers have varied considerably. On the one hand, the
Court has placed rather strict limits on such powers, while on the other
hand, it has enunciated somewhat permissive guidelines.
Illustrative of the strict limits doctrine is the Court's holding in
Fleming et al v. Page.49 Referring to the limits on Presidential author-
ity even in time of declared war, the Court asserted the power of the
Chief Executive is "purely military."
50
He may invade the hostile country, and subject it to the sovereignty
and authority of the United States. But his conquests do not enlarge
the boundaries of this Union, nor extend the operation of our institu-
tions and laws beyond the limits before assigned to them by the legis-
lative power.
5 1
Judicial opinion focused more precisely on the exercise of emergency
powers in the domestic context in Exparle Merryman.s2 In this Civil
War case, Chief Justice Taney, sitting as a Circuit Court judge, de-
clared that despite the extraordinary crisis of civil conflict the President
was endowed with no innate emergency powers such as the authority to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus. Taney noted:
The clause of the constitution, which authorizes the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, is in the 9th section of the first
article. This article is devoted to the legislative department of the
United States, and has not the slightest reference to the executive
department.
It is the second article of the constitution that provides for the
organization of the executive department, enumerates the powers
conferred on it, and prescribes its duties. And if the high power over
the liberty of the citizen now claimed, was intended to be conferred
on the president, it would undoubtedly be found in plain words in
this article; but there is not a word in it that can furnish the slightest
ground to justify the exercise of the power.
5 3
The strongest statement of strict limits on Presidential emergency
49. Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603 (1850). For a general overview on executive
crisis powers in the United States the standard work is J.M. ShtTH& C. COTTER, PowERs
OF THE PRESIDENT DURING CRISIS (1960).
50. Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 614 (1850).
51. Id. at 614-15.
52. Exparte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (1861) (No. 9487).
53. Id. at 148-49.
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powers was in another Civil War case, Expare Milligan.54 There a
majority of the court struck down the use of military courts to try civil-
ians in states where the civil courts were still operating, although this
supplanting of the civil courts had the approval of the President.
The High Court has been more disposed to approve the invocation
of crisis powers by the Chief Executive if there is a statutory basis for
the exercise of such power, but holdings in this area are divided. In two
post-World War II cases, Duncan v. Kahanamoku and White v. Steer,55
the Court disapproved as violative of the boundaries between military
and civilian power the emergency action of the Territorial Governor of
Hawaii. The Governor, pursuant to congressional statute, had ordered
the trial of civilians in military courts despite the fact that the civilian
courts were functioning. Somewhat inconsistently, using the emer-
gency rationale of the venerable clear and present danger test, the
Court has ratified legislatively authorized and Presidentially executed
actions to restrain a variety of first Amendment activities.56 In recent
years, however, the Court has taken a restrictive view of the clear and
present danger doctrine and has allowed the executive to apply it only
when "imminent" violence or unlawful action was probable.57
While the invocation of a crisis is no guarantee the Court will ap-
prove of Executive emergency powers which have a statutory basis,
there are cases running from Korematsu v. United States to the more
contemporary Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally which suggest
that the Supreme Court and other federal courts are willing to grant
extraordinary powers to the President if there is a "pressing public ne-
cessity."'58 As the Korematsu Court noted in justifying detention of ci-
vilians of Japanese origin, "hardships are part of war, and war is an
aggregation of hardships." 59 The district court in Connaly, while not
granting the same degree of flexibility to the Executive as Korematsu,
found the use of statutorally granted crisis powers by the executive
branch (in this case price and wage controls) did not "depend on the
54. Exparle Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 121, 127, 135-40 (1866).
55. 327 U.S. 304, 322-24 (1946).
56. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1950); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927).
57. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969).
58. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Amalgamated Meat Cutters
and Butcher Work. v. ConnaUy, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.C.C. 1971).
59. Koremetso v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944).
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existence of the state of war as a condition."' 0 The court was further
persuaded of the legitimacy of Executive action in this particular situa-
tion due to the temporary nature of the crisis, the interrelationship with
international politics and finance, the imposition of broad legislative
standards to guide Executive action, and the legislative requirement
that "any action taken by the Executive. . .must be in accordance with
further standards as developed by the Executive." 6' Korematsu, with-
out explicitly using the words, voices what Canadian jurists would rec-
ognize as the strict emergency test. In Connall, by contrast, there are
echoes of both the Canadian high court's loose emergency test and the
temporary measures test. These two cases separated by 27 years are
illustrative of the United States Supreme Court's inability or unwilling-
ness to invoke a single doctrine applicable to a variety of emergency
conditions. The Court thereby preserves its flexibility to impose its le-
gal and policy judgment on the executive in novel crisis situations.
In contrast to the ambivalent signals from Korematsu and Con-
nall, however, the United States Supreme Court has been generous in
offering some specific guidelines for Executive emergency power in the
domestic context. The dominant contemporary doctrine here emerged
in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer.62 In this 1952 case re-
garding executive branch seizures of steel mills during the Korean War,
the Supreme Court emphasized that presidential crisis power had to
arise from statute or the Constitution. Speaking for the Court, Justice
Black noted:
There is no statute that expressly authorizes the President to take
possession of property as he did here. Nor is there any act of Con-
gress to which our attention has been directed from which such a
power can be fairly implied....
It is clear that if the President has authority to issue the order he did,
it must be found in some provisions of the Constitution. And it is not
claimed that express constitutional language grants the power to the
President.
63
The Court then analyzed three Article II provisions: the Com-
mander-in-Chief power, the Executive power, and the responsibility to
faithfully execute the laws. The Court found that none of them, with-
60. Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Work. v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 762
(D.C.C. 1971).
61. Id. at 758.
62. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
63. Id. at 585, 587.
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out the express authorization of Congress, granted power to the Presi-
dent to seize private property.
Dismissing prior episodes wherein Presidents had seized private
property during labor crises, the Court emphasized that Congress re-
tained exclusive authority to make laws. "The Founders of this Nation
entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and
bad times."'
The most famous element of the Youngstown decision is the con-
curring opinion of Justice Jackson which is widely quoted and was of
particular interest to the congressional committees studying Executive
emergency power during the nineteen seventies. Jackson evolved a tri-
partite conception of presidential crisis powers, linking and legitimizing
these powers in accordance with their congruence to the express intent
of Congress. Jackson asserted that the President's power was at its
maximum and, by implication, judicial review at its minimum when he
acted pursuant to an express authorization of Congress. When the
President acts "[I]n the absence of either a congressional grant or denial
of authority, he can only rely upon his independent powers, but there is
a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent au-
thority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. 65 Finally, when the
President acted contrary to the express or implied mandate of Con-
gress, his power was at its nadir.
It there are central themes to be found in court doctrine regarding
Presidential domestic emergency powers, they are that the courts usu-
ally apply a strict standard of scrutiny to such actions, insist that the
emergency power have a clear statutory base, and narrowly interpret
the Chief Executive's constitutional powers when invoked to justify cri-
sis action taken within the United States. Once Congress authorizes the
Chief Executive to employ emergency powers the Courts appear to be
ready to give him a relatively free rein.
A basic problem with this free rein standard is that many emer-
gency statutes grant virtually open-ended authority to the President,
providing him with the very kind of unchecked power over which the
Court expressed its unease. To that extent, effective control over Exec-
utive crisis power with a statutory base may ultimately rest with the
Congress.
64. Id. at 589.
65. Id. at 637.
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VII. CONGRESSIONAL LIMITS ON EXECUTIVE
DOMESTIC EMERGENCY POWERS
While Congress has been freer in bestowing emergency powers
upon the Chief Executive than has the Canadian Parliament, Congress
also has given more recent attention to the implications of those powers
than has Parliament.66 One reason for this attention was the Watergate
crisis, with its pervasive suspicion of Executive power. A second factor,
however, was the vast assembly of emergency powers, granted the Pres-
ident by the Congress in over 470 laws. The Canadians by contrast had
concentrated their Executive's emergency powers in one constitutional
and two statutory provisions.
The President has used his emergency power more extensively
than his Canadian counterpart by declaring seven separate emergencies
from 1917 to 1971.67 When Congress commenced its research into the
general topic of emergency powers in 1972, four national emergencies
were still in effect. They were declared respectively in 1933, 1950, 1970
and 1971.68 These emergencies had activated all of the then existing
emergency statutes enacted by Congress. The President could have
employed those powers with dictatorial effect.
Following failure of the two Houses of Congress to agree on con-
vening a joint committee to examine the issue of crisis powers, the Sen-
ate Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delgated
Emergency Powers began its work in 1973. The Committee conducted
an extensive three-year study which, in addition to valuable research
published in assorted reports, recommended a National Emergencies
Act. The Act was slightly modified, and became law on September 14,
1976.
The National Emergencies Act has no preamble or statement of
purpose. Such purpose must be divined from a reading of the assorted
Congressional Committee reports that accompanied various drafts of
the Act. The first goal of the Senate Special Committee was to redress
66. Reacting to six peacetime national emergency declarations from 1933 to 1971 the
United States Senate from 1973-1976 investigated the issue of Presidential emergency pow-
ers through its Special Committee on National Emergencies. Since the Canadian Govern-
ment had declared only one non-wartime emergency in the past sixty years, there was less
pressure on the Parliament to Investigate its executive emergency powers. See SEaTE
COMM. ON Gov. OPERATIONS AND DELEGATED EMERGENCY PowERs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.,
THE NATIONAL EMERGENCIES ACT (Comm. Print 1976).
67. SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY POWER STATUTES, supra note 41, at 9; NATIONAL
EMERGENCIES ACT, supra note 66, at 1.
68. SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, NATIONAL EMERGENCIES ACT, S.
REP. No. 93-1193, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974).
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a perceived imbalance between the Legislative and Executive branches.
Referring to the fact that emergency rule had existed in the United
States for over forty years the Committee noted:
This dangerous state of affairs is a direct result of Congress's failure
to establish effective means for the handling of emergencies and its
willingness to defer to Executive branch leadership . . .Congress,
through its own actions has transferred awesome magnitudes of
power to the Executive without ever examining the cumulative effect
of that delegation of responsibility.
69
The Special Committee seems to have accepted and reiterated the dic-
tum of Justice Jacksons's concurring opinion in the Youngstown Sheet
and Tube Co. v. Sawyer decision: "[E]mergency powers are consistent
with free government only when their control is lodged elsewhere than
in the Executive who exercises them."70 The second and rather ambi-
tious committee goal was to provide for regularized procedures and
standards for declaring, overseeing, and terminating future emer~en-
cies.71 Finally, the Committee wished to abolish the four actual states
of emergency still in existence and the accompanying extraordinary
powers to the Chief Executive.72 Even a cursory analysis of the Na-
tional Emergencies Act shows the Special Committee achieved only the
last of these three goals.
The Act has five titles.73 Title One terminates all Presidentially
declared emergencies, providing a two year period of grace to permit
orderly adjustment by various Executive departments. Title Two re-
quires the Chief Executive to publish all proclamations of national
emergencies in the Federal Register and voids any proclamations not
meeting this mandate. The purpose of Title Two is to correct the rather
casual behavior of past Presidents, who used a variety of procedures to
publicly declare and publish official states of emergency. Title Two
also provides for repeal of any state of emergency by Congressional
concurrent resolution or by Presidential proclamation. This section re-
quires Congress meet to consider a vote on ending a state of emergency
once every six months after the emergency has been declared.74 A final
provision of Title Two automatically terminates any national emer-
69. SPECIAL COMM. ON NAT'L EMERGENCIES, FINAL REPORT, supra note 46, at 1,
70. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 652 (1952).
71. SPECIAL COMM. ON NAT'L EMERGENCIES, FINAL REPORT, supra note 46, at 13.
72. Id. at 10.
73. National Emergencies Act, §§ 101-502, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-51).
74. But see the Canadian Bill of Rights, 1960, CAN. REV. STAT. c.44 (1970), supra note
5, § 6. By contrast, as provided in Section 6, any ten members of the Canadian Parliament
can force a Parliamentary debate within four days after the declaration of an emergency.
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gency one year after its declaration unless the President decides to con-
tinue the emergency in effect. Title Three requires the President
specify and publish in the Federal Register each particular statute
whose powers he intends to employ during the emergency. The ration-
ale of Title Three is to prevent all emergency statutes from coming into
force regardless of whether they are relevant to the crisis at hand. Title
Four requires the President upon the declaration of a national emer-
gency to collect all significant Executive branch orders, rules, regula-
tions, and expenditures pertinent to the emergency and forward them
to Congress. Title Five repeals seven minor national emergency stat-
utes which were considered obsolete and lacked important policy im-
plications. It continues in existence eight provisions of the United
States Code dealing with banking, property used by the military, fed-
eral contract procedures, and military promotion policy. Finally, it
also requires each House and Senate Committee with jurisdiction over
any provision of eight laws referred to in Section 502 of Title 5 to make
a complete investigation regarding these emergency statutes and report
to Congress within nine months.
Unlike many controversial public policy issues that stimulate de-
bate and result in dissenting analysis and comment in the relevant com-
mittee reports, the National Emergencies Act surprisingly provoked no
such minority reports. Absence of dissent on crucial public policy is-
sues generally means either a consensus bill was enacted by Congress
or the legislation was mostly of symbolic value affecting few substan-
tive interests of the parties involved. Regrettably the latter case seems
to be true regarding the National Emergencies Act.
The Act ignores so many crucial aspects of emergency power pol-
icy and embodies such weak provisions that its overall impact on bal-
ancing of executive and legislative domestic emergency powers is
minimal. For example, in contrast to the Canadian War Measures Act,
the Act provides no definition or limits on what should or might consti-
tute an emergency or crisis. This gives the President no expression of
Congressional intent which could be used for guidance and control of
the Chief Executive's decision to declare an emergency.
During final floor debate in the House on this aspect of emergency
powers, Congressman Moorhead questioned whether there is "... any
intent here to limit either the President's power or flexibility to declare
a national emergency."75 Congressman Flowers, who was the subcom-
mittee chairman who reported the bill and was also its floor manager
75. 122 CONG. REc. 28466 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Moorhead).
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declared "there is not."7 6
The provision in the Act calling for an automatic termination date
for a state of emergency on the anniversary of its declaration is weak
since, within ninety days before the termination date, the President can
simply declare that the emergency will stay in effect.77 Such a declara-
tion at once grants great flexibility to the President in deciding when
and if to end an emergency and at the same time places the onus and
political risk on Congress to act affirmatively to terminate an emer-
gency against the President's wishes. By contrast, the British Parlia-
ment, faced with overwhelming peril in World War II never granted
emergency powers to the Prime Minister for more than one month at a
time.78 A truly automatic termination of Executive crisis powers would
not likely imperil the United States and would have the salutory effect
of forcing the President to carry the burden and justify the continued
need for such powers. During the House debate on PL 94-412 a propo-
sal by Congressman Conyers to set an automatic termination date be-
yond the President's control for all emergencies was defeated in the
Committee of the Whole by a vote of 36-17.79
The President is not forced to justify the need for continuing the
state of emergency. Neither is he required by the Act to present and
justify to Congress the reasons why the emergency was declared. The
Canadian War Measures Act, by providing for quick debate on the
assumption of emergency powers, virtually forces the Prime Minister to
-promptly explain his actions to Parliament and the public. Congress
does not even require a prompt debate on the declaration of an emer-
gency. In contrast to the War Powers Resolution Act of 1973,80 which
requires the President to make every effort to consult with Congress
before he acts, the National Emergency Act provides no such consulta-
tion requirement, although Congressman Drinian unsuccessfully of-
fered such an amendment on the House floor.
8'
Although the Act terminated all existing national emergencies ef-
fective two years after its enactment, the Congress left untouched
ninety-eight percent of the statutes granting emergency authority to the
President. Furthermore, the Act made no provision for systematic re-
76. Id. at 28466.
77. National Emergencies Act, § 202(d), 50 U.S.C. § 1622 (1970).
78. 121 CONG. REC. 27636 (1975).
79. Id. at 27645.
80. War Powers Resolution, H.R.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
(1975).
81. 121 CONG. Rnc. 27637, 27645-46 (1975).
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view of the content or the ultimate necessity of such statutes. Not only
was Congressional review of these statutes ignored but oversight by the
courts of the President's action in time of emergency was also ignored
insofar as Congress failed to provide standards to guide judicial review
of the Chief Executive's proclamation or exercise of emergency powers.
Congress seems to have overlooked the fact that over the past forty
years it has lost its character as a part time lawmaking body and has
evolved into essentially a full time legislature which, in crisis situation,
could be called back to Washington from any brief recess in less than
twelve hours. Therefore Congress need not delegate much, if any,
power to the President to declare domestic states of emergency. Con-
gress can and perhaps ought to consider whether it alone should exer-
cise such power. The debate on PL 94-412 unfortunately fails to
broach this subject. Finally, Congress's casual attitude toward the en-
tire issue of control over crisis power seems to be emphasized by the
fact that the Senate Special Committee on National Emergencies has
been disbanded and its staff scattered. Furthermore, none of the com-
mittees of Congress who under Title 5 Section 502 (b) of Act were re-
quired to analyze eight emergency statutes and report back to their
chamber within nine months did so.
8 2
VIII. CONCLUSION
If an overall judgment on legislative and judicial controls over
emergency powers in Canada and the United States is to be made, it is
that such controls are rather limited with great deference shown to the
judgment of the Chief Executive. Each nation grants a frightening
range of authority to its Executive by statute but provides little or no
guidance to the Executive regarding proclamation or use of the power.
Neither country provides for truly automatic termination of the emer-
gency as Britain did in World War II when Parliament granted the
Prime Minister extraordinary power for only a month at a time.
Elites in both countries appear to take a somewhat relaxed attitude
toward states of emergency. The Canadian Prime Minister put the
whole nation under his emergency powers to deal with the localized
problem of terrorism in the city of Montreal. In the United States,
Congress tarried for forty years before deciding that the nation ought
not to be governed under a permanent state of emergency.
Recent controls embodied by the Congress in PL 94-412 continue
82. Letter from Raymond Netter, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division-Li-
brary of Congress, to U.S. Senator Charles Mathias (Jan. 4, 1976).
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the mostly symbolic steps of the War Powers Resolution Act of 1973:
imposing public disclosure requirements over what the Executive
chooses to do rather than mandating standards to guide executive a6-
tion. In this regard the Canadian Parliament, with the War Measures
Act, is in a similar situation: each legislature insisting only on the right
to be told what the Executive has done after the Executive has acted.
In each nation, the courts, perhaps properly so given the political
elements of emergency powers, have in recent years taken a rather per-
missive tone regarding what is deemed an area of wide Executive dis-
cretion. So long as the Executive operates within the extremely
expansive boundaries for action set by the legislature and does not
tread heavily on First Amendment freedoms, at least in the United
States, he may roam at will. Even the famous Jackson standards from
the Youngstown case for judging the acceptability of Executive action
impose few restraints on Executive action so long as Congress offers the
President statutory carte blanche.
It seems clear that the politicians and policy makers in Canada
and the United States who have considered the issue of emergency
powers and drafted the statutory framework have implicitly weighed
the risks of the demise of democracy through abuse of crisis powers
against the risks to the nation from a crisis which would become un-
manageable due to insufficient Executive emergency powers. In such a
balancing process these decision-makers have determined that too few
powers were a greater risk than too many. Two generations of politi-
cians in both countries, overwhelmed by such serious crises as the de-
pression, World War II, the Korean War, and the Cold War, began to
think of domestic emergency powers in almost routine terms while si-
multaneously repressing thoughts of the risks such powers might ulti-
mately pose to the survival of their democratic institutions. The
thought that the loss of democratic freedoms cannot happen here might
not be as firmly held today in the light of recent coups in India, South
Korea and the Philippines, where executive emergency powers helped
to undo the democratic institutions.
Before more definitive judgments can be made regarding the ap-
propriate balance of legislative and executive crisis powers additional
cross-national historical, legal, and empirical research should be under-
taken to determine what specific factors and weaknesses led to the de-
mise of democracy in these three nations. Specific statutory or
constitutional guidelines might then be prepared based on this re-
search.
The ultimate judgments on emergency powers are policy judg-
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ments and should be made by the respective legislatures following pub-
lic debate and consultation with appropriate executive officials. To
force decisions concerning apportionment and use of crisis power upon
the courts would be unwise. The courts are isolated from important
sources of policy and political information; they lack the capacity to
generate a broad public debate on the benefits and risks of alternative
courses of action; and they are unlikely when deciding a case in time of
emergency to have the necessary repose to consider the matter with the
reflection it requires."
Whether the legislature of either nation will respond to the less
than immediate pressures of such a problem as domestic emergency
powers and renew a public debate on this issue is doubtful. Further
crisis and further risky exercise of Executive emergency powers will
likely be necessary to jolt the lawmakers out of their complacency to
face this Hobson's choice of democracy.
83. New York Times Company v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,748-49,753 (1971), (Bur-
ger, C.J. and Harlan, J., dissenting).
No. 1]

